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INTRODUCTION

In the 'late 1980s, a series of well-publicized defense contractor
abuses brought the ordinarily obscure topic of government contracting
into the public eye.1 These abuses included not only instances of
seemingly wasteful charges, like the infamous $600 toilet seat, ap
proved by a complicit Department of Defense,2 but also examples of
truly fraudulent activity such as knowingly overbilling and supplying
inferior quality goods.3 The fraud cases grabbed the public attention
for three primary reasons. First, enormous sums of money were in-

1. See Major Fraud Act of 1988: Hearings on H.R. 3500 and H.R. 3911 Before the Sub
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth Cong. 100 (1987) [hereinafter
House Hearings]; William S. Malarkey, Government Contract Fraud, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
875, 875-76 (1989); David C. Morrison, Pentagon Scandals Recur Despite Waves of Reform,
BALT. SUN, July 10, 1988, at lE, referenced in The Major Fraud Act, and the Government
Fraud Law Enforcement Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 3911 and S. 1958 Before the Sen.
Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth Cong.4 (1988) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
2. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 5; Edward Walsh, President's Defense Appeal
Finds Little Support on Hill Wary of Waste, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1986, at AS.
3. See Charles P.Alexander, Crime in the Suites, TIME, June 10, 1985, at 56.
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volved.4 Second, the nature of the fraud often posed a direct danger to
United States troops, potentially compromising "national security." 5
Finally, large contractors, perceived as the perpetrators of the fraud,
were apparently going unpunished.6
In response, Congress passed the Major Fraud Act of 1988 ("the
Act").7 Congress intended the Act to "provide federal prosecutors
with an additional criminal statute targeting major procurement fraud
committed against the United States." 8 As a general matter, prosecu
tion under the Act is limited to "major fraud": instances where the
value of the contract exceeds $1,000,000.9
A substantial portion of all federal government expenditures is
paid to contractors. For example, the Defense Department alone
spends more than $200,000,000 annually on contractors, accounting for
fourteen percent of all federal spending in 1997.1 0 As in the private
sector, prime contractors - the party that has privity with the ultimate
client, in this case the federal government - frequently enter into
subcontracts. In those cases, subcontractors perform services or supply
or manufacture goods for the government.
The role of the subcontractor includes a range of functions from
supplying components to be included in a final product or providing
some service to the prime contractor, to performing essentially the en
tire prime contract. In the latter case, the prime contractor's role may

4. See Elizabeth Tucker, Two Contractors Targeted in Defense Fraud Probe, WASH.
POST, Sept. 17, 1986, at D14 (discussing two cases involving losses suffered by the govern
ment on the order of $100 million).
5. See Eric Pianin, Faulty Parts Still Aboard Navy Ships; Sen. Nunn Calls Risk to Mili
tary Personnel 'Outrageous,' WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1987, at A21.
6. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 100 (" We have documented . . . quite a few ex
amples of where we thought what I call some of the big boys got away."); Kathleen Day,
Motorola to Plead Guilty to Fraud, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1988, at Al6 (discussing a plea
bargain under which the contractor paid fines but no individuals were prosecuted and the
company was not barred from future contracts). The defense industry's dismissive attitude
toward the issue also may have fueled the strong public and congressional reaction. See
Sandra Sugawara, Defense Probe Is Decried as A 'Lynch Mob': Aerospace Lobbyist Denies
Rampant Fraud, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1988, at D2.
7. Pub. L. No. 100-700, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 4631 (codified at 18 U. S.C. § 1031 (1994)). The
Act was amended in 1989 to add provisions rewarding "whistle-blowers" financially. Major
Fraud Act Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-123, 103 Stat. 759. Not coincidentally, 1988
was also an election year. See Brian T.FitzPatrick, Congressional Re-election Through Sym
bolic Politics: The Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 47 (1994).
8. S. REP. NO. 100-503, at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U. S.C.C.A.N. 5969, 5969.
9. See 18 U. S.C. § 1031(a). The threshold was adopted, in part, to focus attention on
large contractors who were not deterred by existing punishments. See H. R. REP. No. 100610, at 5 (1988).
10. The Federal Page: Dividing Defense Dollars,

WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1998, at A23.
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be limited to taking a fee or a markup and conducting contract ad
ministration with the government.1 1
In 1996, defendants Edwin and John Brooks and their company,
B & D Electric, appealed convictions under the Act to the Fourth
Circuit.1 2 B & D Electric had fraudulently mislabeled and misrepre
sented the specifications of components supplied to two United States
Navy prime contractors.13 Although both prime contracts were valued
at more than $1,000,000, B & D Electric's subcontracts were each val
ued at much less than the statutory threshold. 14 Brooks contended on
appeal that because B & D Electric's subcontracts did not exceed the
$1,000,000 threshold, he could not be prosecuted under the Act.1 5
The Fourth Circuit rejected Brooks's claim. In performing a de
tailed evaluation of the Act's language and legislative history, as well
as policy concerns underlying the Act, the court held that the Act ap
plied to cases where the prime contract, but not necessarily the spe
cific subcontract, exceeded the $1,000,000 threshold.1 6 The court be
lieved that this interpretation would enable prosecutors to combat the
fraud identified by Congress more effectively.17
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that its holding conflicted with
the conclusion reached by the Second Circuit.1 8 In United States v.
Nadi,19 the Second Circuit concluded that the Act did not apply if the
specific subcontract under which fraud was committed did not exceed
$1,000,000.20 The Nadi court also addressed the statutory language and
legislative history of the Act and the policy concerns underlying the
Act in reaching this decision. 21 Although the scopes of the analyses
were similar, the two courts reached opposite conclusions.22

11. See 8 JOHN COSGROVE MC BRIDE & THOMAS S. TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS§§ 49.10-49.30 (2001).
12. United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1997).
13. See id. at 368.
14. The values of the two prime contracts were $9,000,000 and $5,000,000; the values of
B & D Electric's respective subcontracts were $51,544 and $1,470. Id. at 368.
15. Id. at 368.
16. Id. at 368-70.
17. Id. at 369-70.
18. Id. at 369.
19. 996 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 933 (1993).
20. See Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551. Because the value of the subcontract involved in Nadi did
exceed $1,000,000, the conclusion was distinguished by the Brooks court, among other rea
sons, as dicta. Brooks, 111 F.3d at 369. The Second Circuit, however, did explicitly adopt the
rule: "[A] reasonable reading of the statute, in light of the legislative history, requires that
we adopt the rule . . . whereby the value of the contract is determined by looking to the spe
cific contract upon which the fraud is based." Id.
21. Id. at 551-52. The Supreme Court of Connecticut also implicitly adopted the Nadi
interpretation by assuming that the value of a procurement contract exceeded $1,000,000
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This Note adopts the Fourth Circuit's position and argues that
courts should read the Act to impose liability on contractors and sub
contractors when the value of the prime contract exceeds $1,000,000,
even if the subcontract itself is less than $1,000,000. Part I of this Note
examines the statute and concludes that both the specific text on li
ability and the statute taken as a whole support liability for "low
value" 23 subcontractors. Because the mere existence of the disagree
ment between the circuits suggests some ambiguity in the statute itself,
Part II examines the legislative history of the Act. It concludes that
Congress knew the Act would apply to low-value subcontractors and,
more generally, was openly hostile to business groups' efforts to limit
the scope of the Act. Part III discusses the benefits of judicial and
prosecutorial clarity as well as the symbolic value of use of a statute
specifically tailored to the crime of contract fraud, and counters argu
ments that prosecution of low-value subcontractors is unfair. The Note
concludes that these arguments support prosecution of low-value sub
contractors and accordingly recommends that courts adopt the Fourth
Circuit's position when faced with this issue in the future.
I.

FIRST THINGS FIRST: THE STATUTE

This Part examines the statute from two different perspectives the specific text prescribing liability and the Act as a whole - and
concludes that the Act extends to subcontractors and imposes liability
when either the prime contract or the subcontract exceeds $1,000,000.
A.

The Statutory Limit on Liability

Statutory interpretation begins with the text of the statute,24 and
the text here should be read as imposing liability on low-value subcon
tractors. The statutory language prescribing liability reads:
Whoever knowingly executes ...any scheme or artifice with the intent to
defraud the United States ... in any procurement of property or services
when holding that discharging an employee who resisted participation in the fraud violated
public policy. See Faulkner v. United Tech. Corp., 693 A.2d 293, 296 n.6 ( Conn. 1997).
22. Compare Brooks, 111 F.3d at 368, with Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551; see also Major
Wallace, Federal Circuits Split on Application of the Major Fraud Act to Government Con·
tracts, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1997, at 41 (summarizing the development of the split). Since the
split developed in 1997, the Third Circuit recognized the division but avoided the question.
See United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 472 (3d Cir. 1998). This issue has not been addressed
within the remaining circuit courts of appeal.
23. This Note will use the term "low-value " to refer to contracts or subcontracts under
$1,000,000. This Note assumes that the prime contract with the United States is valued at
more than $1,000,000 unless otherwise noted.
24. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U. S. 681, 685 (1985) ("It is axiomatic that
'(t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.' "
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
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as a prime contractor with the United States or as a subcontractor or
supplier on a contract with the United States, if the value of the contract,

subcontract, or any constituent part thereof, for such property or services

...or imprisoned . . .25
A simple reading of this language leads to the conclusion that any con
tractor, subcontractor, or supplier who commits fraud can be liable if
any component of the contract exceeds $1,000,000. 2 6 Because the stat
ute reads "any constituent part," 27 satisfaction of the dollar threshold
need not be achieved through the fraudulent actor's own contract.28
Furthermore, the statute's use of the word "or" within the list of par
ties who are potentially liable indicates an intent to include all such
parties as potential defendants.
This reading of the statute also accords with the canon of interpre
tation requiring that the statute be interpreted so as to give effect to
each word of the statute. 29 At first blush, one might argue that an in
terpretation that relies only on the value of the contract and ignores
the subcontract reads out the term "subcontract" from the statutory
language. Jo To say that any prime contract with a value over $1,000,000
satisfies the threshold yet the value of the subcontract does not matter
seems to leave the latter term meaningless. J1 Accordingly, this argu
ment suggests that, to comport with the canon of construction, low
value subcontractors should not be covered by the Act. The term
"subcontract," however, does have meaning when a subcontractor is
awarded a subcontract valued at more than $1,000,000 by a prime con
tractor who itself does not hold a $1,000,000 contract directly with the
government. As the court explained in Brooks:
is $1,000,000 or more shall ...be fined

.

[I]f a prime contractor had entered into three separate contracts, agree
ing under each to supply the United States with $ 750,000 worth of
equipment, but entered into a single supply contract with a subcontractor
for $1 million worth of parts, the subcontractor would be covered by the
Act.J2
25. 18 U.S.C.§ 1031(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
26. See United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 368-69 (4th Cir. 1997) ("From a straight
forward reading of this statute ... any contractor or supplier involved with a prime con
tract ... is guilty so long as the prime contract, a subcontract, a supply agreement, or any
constituent part of such a contract is valued at $1 million or more.").
27. 18 U. S. C.§ 1031(a) (emphasis added).
28. See Brooks, 111 F.3d at 370.
29. E.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35 (1992); United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("It is our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute . . . .' " (citation omitted)).
30. The statute reads "if the value of the contract, subcontract, or any constituent
part . . . is $1,000,000 or more. . .." 18 U.S.C.§ 1031(a).
31. This follows from the seemingly reasonable, though incorrect, assumption that the
value of the subcontract must always be less than that of the prime contract.
32. Brooks, 111 F.3d at 370.
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Although perhaps unusual, the circumstances described by the Brooks
court give effect to all the statute's language.33
Although the Second Circuit found that the only relevant contract
value was that of the contract under which the fraud occurred,34 its in
terpretation depends on logic flawed by reliance on unpersuasive defi
nitions of statutory terms. The primary basis for that court's interpre
tation was the conclusion that the phrase "if the value of the contract,
subcontract, or any constituent part thereof" tracks the preceding
phrase, which reads "as a prime contractor with the United States or
as a subcontractor or supplier on a contract in which there is a prime
contract. . . ."35 In sum, the Second Circuit interpreted this language to
mean that "where the prime contractor is accused of fraud, we look to
the value of the prime contract, but where the subcontractor is ac
cused of fraud we look to the value of the subcontract, and where the
supplier is accused of fraud we look to the value of the related con
stituent part of the contract."36 Closer examination, however, reveals
that the two phrases should not be interpreted to have tracking, or
parallel, structures.
The primary error in this interpretation is that it improperly as
sumes mutual exclusivity among the three terms in each series. In
other words, the Second Circuit assumes that a contractor is not a sub
contractor is not a supplier, and a contract is not a subcontract is not a
"constituent part." The terms "supplier" and "constituent part," how
ever, do not unambiguously exclude the other terms. Rather, both the
general meaning and the trade usage of the language suggest that con
tractors, and certainly subcontractors, are "suppliers."37 Similarly, a
subcontract is not plainly distinct from a constituent part, and the in
clusive interpretation of "constituent part" is further emphasized by

33. Moreover, the legislative history reveals that such circumstances are not merely a
post hoc contrivance to give effect (artificially) to the language but rather were explicitly
intended by Congress to be subject to the Act.See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
34. United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[A] reasonable reading of
the statute, in light of the legislative history, requires that we adopt the rule . . . whereby the
value of the contract is determined by looking to the specific contract upon which the fraud
is based. ").
35. See Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551 (quoting 18 U. S. C.§ 1031(a)).
36. Id.
37. See MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 108-11 (1944) (holding that the
Miller Act does not define the terms subcontractor and supplier, and that the meaning of the
terms must be found in the usage of the trade); Graham, Van Leer & Elmore Co., Inc. v.
Jones & Wood, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 667, 669 (D.D. C. 1987) (implying that the terms subcon
tractor and supplier are interchangeable in a common law contract case); Technassociates,
Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 200, 205-206 (1988) (quoting Government Standard Form
No. 1436, a settlement proposal, which states that "[t]he term 'subcontractors,' . . . includes
suppliers ").
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the word "any."3 8 Most strikingly, no standard or trade definitions
suggest correlation of a "constituent part" to a "supplier," as is vital to
the Second Circuit's construction.39
The loose and overlapping definitions of these terms fulfill the
purpose of creating broad coverage of the law,40 but are not compati
ble with an attempt to define precise, tracking definitions.41 Because
the Second Circuit used flawed logic to determine that the contract
subcontract-component part series tracked the contractor
subcontractor-supplier series, other courts should not follow the re
sulting conclusion that only the subcontract value is dispositive with
respect to subcontractor liability. Instead, courts should adopt the
more straightforward reading of the Fourth Circuit, which follows the
text by simply looking at the value of "any" part.
B.

The Statute as a Whole

In addition to the specific text at issue, a broader examination of
the statute supports the conclusion that the Act should apply to low
value subcontractors.42 This Section examines three issues concerning
the larger contours of the statute: the magnitude of the fraud, the stat
ute of limitations, and the target of the fraud. It concludes that these
broader themes support application not only to prime contractors, but
to low-value subcontractors as well.
The Act does not look to the magnitude of the fraud when estab
lishing liability.43 Rather, it looks to the value of a contract.44 Thus,
while a potential objection to the Fourth Circuit's broad interpretation
is that it is unfair to subcontractors because the magnitude of the fraud

38. 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a). See Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 587-89
(1980) (indicating the importance of the phrase "any other final action").
39. See Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551 ("[ W]here the supplier is accused of fraud we look to the
value of the related constituent part of the contract. ").
40. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing goal of an expansive statute).
41. Moreover, the legislative history reveals that Congress added these two clauses to
the bill at two separate points in time by two different bodies, suggesting no intent that the
phrases "tracked " as a matched pair. See H.R. 3911, lOOth Cong. (1988) (adding the
contract-subcontract-constituent part clause); 134 CONG. REC. 31569 (1988) (adding the
contractor-subcontractor-supplier clause).
42. See Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 11 (1962) (holding that a particular statu
tory interpretation should be considered with respect to the larger goals and policies em
bodied in the statute); NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC
TION § 46.05 (1992).
43. The magnitude of the fraud means the amount of money that the government loses
as a result of the fraud. This amount would include the unjust enrichment enjoyed by the
fraudulent actor, as well as costs associated with correcting the effects of the fraud. See infra
note 153 and accompanying text.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a).
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may be small,4 5 on its face the Act applies to all prime contractors with
$1,000,000 contracts, regardless of the magnitude of the fraud.4 6
Congress did require looking to the magnitude of the fraud in portions
of the Act that address damages, showing that consideration of the
magnitude is important in some instances.47 The threshold question of
liability, however, is not such an instance.48 While applying the Act to
cases where the size of the fraud is small may appear harsh, it is undis
puted that the Act applies to prime contractors in such cases, and
there is no justification to treat subcontractors differently.49
The importance of the contract value rather than the fraud value is
demonstrated by the facts of United States v. Sain.50 In Sain the defen
dant committed fraud by using less expensive regenerated carbon in a
water treatment plant constructed and operated for the Army after
specifying that it would need to use more expensive virgin carbon.51
Supplying this carbon was not included in the original $5,000,000 con
tract, and so was addressed in a series of three contract modifications,
each for $27,500, in which Sain charged the Army for virgin carbon.52
The Third Circuit held that, even though the component part (the
modification) was less than $1,000,000, the modifications did not stand
alone but were incorporated elements of the prime contract; thus, the
Act applied based on the value of the prime contract.53 These facts
parallel the subcontractor situation in which a low-value component
part is attached to a prime contract.
Another aspect of the Act that supports its application to low
value subcontractors is the extended statute of limitations. The Act

45. See United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1993). Similar objections were
raised in congressional hearings concerning the Act. See infra note 76 and accompanying
text.
46. See 18 U. S. C. § 1031(a).
47. See 18 U. S.C. § 1031(b) (authorizing enhanced fines when "the gross loss to the
Government or the gross gain to a defendant is $500,000 or greater . . . ); 18 U. S. C. §
1031(d) (authorizing fines "up to twice the amount of the gross loss or gross gain involved in
the offense . . .").
"

48. See 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a).
49. As it turns out, application of the Act to instances of low-magnitude fraud is not so
harsh after all because fines and sentences under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
are proportional to the magnitude of the fraud. See infra Section IIl.B.
50. 141 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1998).
51. Id. at 468-69.
52. Id. at 466-68.
53. Id. at 472-73 ("(E]ven though Sain used the modifications to defraud the Army, the
fraud intrinsically involved the approximately $7 million contract. "). The Third Circuit did
not pass judgment on the similar question of a subcontract between the prime contractor and
a subcontractor rather than a modification between the prime contractor and the govern
ment. See id. at 472.
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grants a seven-year statute of limitations for prosecutions,54 and the
rationale for an extended statutory period applies to fraud by subcon
tractors as well as by prime contractors. The longer statutory period
differentiates the Act from other statutes that could be used to prose
cute fraud,55 such as the False Claims Act,56 the False Statements Act,57
and the federal anti-conspiracy statute,58 all of which are subject to a
five-year limitations period.59 Congress extended the statutory period
in response to perceived complexities of major fraud investigations.60
Therefore, one might incorrectly assume that applying the Act to .
"simple" subcontractor cases might not be appropriate.
Investigating subcontractor fraud, however, may be just as com
plex as investigating prime contractor fraud. Low-dollar fraud may be
easier to hide within the bulk of a large prime contract. Likewise,
while large contractors typically have nominal institutional systems to
detect fraud by their employees, 61 fraud by small subcontractors may
more often be instigated at the highest levels of the company.62
Even if not all investigations are complex, Congress's finding that
some prosecutions require lengthy investigations does not mean that
all prosecutions must be complex. The Act undisputedly applies to
cases of prime contractors committing small frauds, whether difficult
to discover or not. Again, there is no reason to create a special inter
pretation for subcontractors.
Moreover, fraud by both prime contractors and subcontractors
hurts the intended beneficiary of the Act, the United States govern-

54. 18 U. S. C.§ 1031(f) (1994). Indeed, the Act is often the last resort for prosecution
when other counts have been time-barred. See, e.g. , Under Seal v. United States (In re
Grand Jury Subpoena), 175 F.3d 332, 338 (1999) (" Because the statute of limitations had
apparently run on a number of the potential criminal charges, the criminal investigation was
focused solely on whether [the] conduct violated the Major Fraud Act . . . . ).
"

55. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 77.
56. 18 u.s.c.§§ 286, 287 (1994).
57. 18 u.s.c.§ 1001 (1994).
58. See 18 U.S.C.§ 371 (1994).
59. 18 U. S. C. § 3282 (1994) (specifying a five-year statute of limitations for all non
capital offenses unless otherwise specified).
60. The legislative history supports the conclusion that the statutory period was ex
tended to accommodate complex investigations. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 42.
61. See U NITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOD PROCUREMENT: USE
AND ADMINISTRATION OF DOD'S VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM 2 (1996) (noting
that from 1986 to 1994, 138 contractors had detected and voluntarily disclosed potential
fraud under a DOD program. These contractors represented 48 of the largest 100 contrac
tors and 90 of the remaining approximately 32,000 contractors.).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1997). Of course, upper
level management may be involved in the fraud at large firms also. See Faulkner v. United
Tech. Corp., 693 A.2d 293 ( Conn. 1997) (employee fired for refusing to participate in
fraudulent scheme).
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ment.63 Even if a subcontractor commits the fraudulent act, the loss
induced is likely to fall eventually on the government via the prime
contract. For example, in United States v. Spring Works, Inc.,64 sub
standard springs provided by a subcontractor were used in helicopters,
cruise missiles, fighter jets, and the space shuttle. The cost to the gov
ernment to correct the problems was estimated to be over $1,500,000.65
The subcontract value, however, was reported to be only $160.66 The
adverse effects to the United States are severe whether a prime con
tractor or subcontractor commits the fraud. By compromising the exe
cution of a high-dollar-value contract, subcontractor fraud is equally
"major" from the perspective of the United States.
II.

P OLITIC S AS USUAL: T HE LEGI SLATI VE HI STO RY

Although Part I demonstrates that the Act's text standing alone
supports application to low-value subcontractors, the existence of a
split of authority suggests that the text may not completely resolve the
question. In cases where the language itself is ambiguous, the Supreme
Court has recognized the validity of seeking guidance from the legisla
tive history.67 From another perspective, legislative history manifests
the intent of Congress.6 8 Whether couched in terms of resolving ambi63. See 18 U. S. C.§ 1031 (a)(l) (1994).
64. No. C R 86-1112- WM B ( C.D. Cal. April 6, 1987) (sentencing memorandum), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 1, at 170.
65. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 167.
66. United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 1997).
67. E.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 508-09 (1981) (" We begin
by considering the extent to which the text . . . answers the question before us. Concluding
that the text is ambiguous . . . we then seek guidance from legislative history . . . . ).
"

68. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n.3 (1981) ("Absent a
clear indication of legislative intent to the contrary, the statutory language controls construc
tion.").
The modern trend is for courts to look to the statutory language above the intent of the
legislature as indicated in legislative history to assess statutory meaning. See SINGER, supra
note 42,§ 48.02. Justice Scalia, in particular, strongly supports this view of interpretation:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of
which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the Members
of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with the context
and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress
which voted on the words of the statute ... and (2) most compatible with the surrounding
body of law ....

Green, 490 U.S. at 528 ( Scalia, J., concurring).

Others have criticized this textualist approach, noting, for example, that textualists have
neglected interpretative canons that promote individual liberty or executive authority while
overusing rules that narrow statutory meaning as a means to promote federalism and states'
rights. See Brandorf C. Mank, Textualism's Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Rein
vigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies,

86 KY. L.J. 527, 528 (1998); see also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 822 (1983) ("I know of no princi
pled, nonpolitical basis for a court to adopt the view that Congress is legislating too much
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guity or finding intent, courts commonly use legislative history to re
solve issues of statutory interpretation even though the practice is con
sidered controversial by some academics, judges, and justices.69
Part II of this Note examines the Act's legislative history and con
cludes that Congress intended the Act to apply to subcontractors with
low-value subcontracts on major prime contracts. Section II.A demon
strates that, in drafting the Act, Congress specifically supported its ap
plication to low-value subcontractors. Section 11.B asserts that
amendments to the statutory language made in response to opponents'
concerns did not change the underlying liability of subcontractors.
Section 11.C gives further attention to specific language in the legisla
tive history that was interpreted differently by the Second and Fourth
Circuits.
A.

Congress Recognized This Very Problem

This section asserts that Congress anticipated the Act's application
to low-value subcontractors and was hostile to those who would ex
empt such parties. Proceedings of the two House hearings conducted
to debate the Act indicate Congress's desire to take a hard line on
fraudulent.actors. The Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary
Committee held an initial hearing on the Act in December 1987.70
Witnesses at the December hearing included sponsors of the legisla
tion, government prosecutors, government auditors, and public

and ought therefore to be reined in by having its statutes construed strictly. I add now that
such a view would be a form of judicial activism because it would cut down on the power of
the legislative branch; and at this moment in history, we do not need more judicial activ
ism. ").
Whether legislative history is consulted to "resolve ambiguity " or to assess "intent " may
be a purely semantic distinction, for, after all, ambiguity can almost always be found if one
looks hard enough. Cf Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
442 P.2d 641, 643 ( Cal. 1968) (finding the belief of perfect verbal expression to be a "rem
nant of a primitive faith " and allowing introduction of extrinsic, parol evidence in an expan
sive set of contract disputes). This parallel between use of parol evidence and legislative his
tory, and the trend to weaken the parol evidence rule in contract cases, have been used to
argue for greater use of legislative history by courts interpreting statutes. See Stephen F.
Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Paro/ Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New
Tex.
tualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J.195, 199 (1998).
69. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Su
preme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Be
yond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1998) (reporting the findings of an empirical study showing
that the Supreme Court invoked legislative history in nearly fifty percent of the statutory
interpretation cases in 1996). Similarly, a Westlaw search conducted by the author discov
ered that the United States Courts of Appeals had cited to the United States Code Congres
sional and Administrative i�ews (U.S.C.C.A.N.) in 340 decisions in 2000.
70. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at I.
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"watchdog" interest groups.71 Every witness took a hard line against
the contracting industry.72
The Subcommittee held a second hearing in March 1988 to provide
an opportunity for opponents of the measure to air their views.73
Representative William Hughes, the sponsor of the bill, greeted these
witnesses by recalling that the December hearing "documented a story
of greed, malfeasance and fraud in procurement law that is unaccept
able,"74 including cases that "can most directly cost Americans their
lives."75
During the March hearing, opponents of the Act objected to po
tential harms to small businesses created by the Act's use of contract
values to trigger application. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce as
serted that the Act "would penalize small businesses in ways that are
both illogical and overwhelming."7 6 The Chamber pointed to the "il
logical" exposure of small businesses acting as subcontractors,77 the
71. See id. at III.
72. See generally id. at 5-6, 149. The subcommittee chairman and sponsor of the bill,
William Hughes, set the tone with his opening remarks: "In today's hearing, we will discuss a
disturbing trend of successive scandals in procurements for spare parts, overhead charges,
malfunctioning equipment and various other fraudulent schemes that bilk the American
taxpayers of billions of dollars and at the same time diminish their confidence in the Execu
tive Branch's ability to efficiently administer essential government functions." Id. at 5.
Similarly: "Simply put, when major fraud occurs, you need a major tool to combat it."
Id. at 9 (testimony of Sen. Grassley). "We also welcome legislation which will enhance our
prosecutive efforts and protect the government against those who would cheat or mislead
it . . . ." Id. at 34 (testimony of John Keeney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General). "H.R.
3500 is a major effort which we welcome in support of our mission of detecting and investi
gating fraud, waste and abuse within the postal service." Id. at 43 (testimony of Donald
Davis, U.S. Postal & Inspection Service). "I share the concern of you and our fellow taxpay
ers about white collar crime in the government contracting environment and, consequently,
welcome any efforts to prevent it or impose stiff penalties on the perpetrators." Id. at 89
(testimony of Fred Newton, Defense Contract Audit Agency). "(S]o I hope that the commit
tee efforts beyond this bill ... is the kind of thing where ... you lead the charge in saying to
the Department of Justice we want to know why these large defense contractors got away
with this." Id. at 102 (testimony of Dina Rasor, Project on Military Procurement).
73. See id. at III, 149-50. Witnesses included representatives of the United States Cham
ber of Commerce, the Electronic Industries Association, and the Professional Services
Council.
74. Id. at 149.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 205 (prepared comments of the United States Chamber of Commerce).
77. Id. ("For example, a small construction firm could be paving a driveway for a large
government office building. The subcontract could be less than $10,000 out of a $20 million
contract for that building. If it is guilty of mischarging $1,000 on its work, it could be liable
for a $40 million fine."). A similar scenario was raised by the Professional Services Council.
See id. at 285 ("Thus, a subcontractor providing $50,000 in services under a $5 million prime
contract could be ordered to pay as much as $10 million on a timesheet overcharge of
$1,000."). At the time, the bill did not include a limit on fines. See H.R. 3911, lOOth Cong.
(1988). The Act as enacted does include an upper limit of $10,000,000. See 18 U.S.C §
1031(c) (1994). Moreover, fines are made proportional to the magnitude of the fraud under
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See infra Section 111.B.
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very issue of disagreement between the Second and Fourth Circuits
addressed by this Note. As a general matter, the opponents of the Act
wanted to tie application, sentences, and penalties, for both prime con
tractors as well as subcontractors, to the magnitude of the fraud rather
than the contract size.78 The opponents also asserted that (1) prosecu
tion should require a showing of knowing and willful intent,79 (2) the
Act would devastate small businesses,80 and (3) above all, the Act sim
ply was not needed.81
The Committee did not receive the opponents' testimony kindly,82
and its response demonstrates that it foresaw the possible prosecution
of low-value subcontractors. The chairman specifically challenged the
worst-case example posed by the Chamber of Commerce: "First, let
me just ask you, Mr. Kipps, do you believe the Department of Justice
would prosecute a subcontractor for a $1,000 mischarge on a $10,000
subcontract on a $20 million contract and ask for a $40 million fine?"83
In other words, the Committee, at least, understood that the govern
ment could prosecute under the Act in such circumstances. Any deci
sion to prosecute would be discretionary rather than limited by stat
ute.84 While the magnitude of the fine or sentence; or even the
likelihood of prosecution, might have been in question, the applicabil
ity of the Act was not.
This direct and specific confrontation of the issue, moreover,
should supersede any broad statement that could suggest a more nar
row reading of the Act.85 One example of such a broad statement is
contained in the Senate report, which states that the Act "would apply
78. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 191-94 (statement of Clarence Kipps).
79. See id. at 192.
80. See id. at 281 (statement of Christopher Cross) ( I would also like to add that we
believe that H.R. 3911 would serve as a deterrent not to fraud, but to entrepreneurship of
small businesses. ").
"

81. See id. at 192.
82. See id. at 295 (comments of Rep. Smith) ("Gentlemen, I am sorry that you cannot be
sitting where we are in a way so that you could have heard yourselves. It is disheartening to
hear testimony like this . ..."); House Hearings, supra note 1, at 311 (comments of Rep.
Hughes) ("I have not heard any constructive suggestions. I have only heard criticisms of
each section of the bill, without fail."); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-610, at 3 (1988).
83. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 312. Mr. Kipps, representing the United States
Chamber of Commerce, stated that he did not think that it would, but feared that prosecu
tors would abusively leverage the possibility during plea bargain negotiations. Representa
tive Hughes responded that existing statutes also gave prosecutors the potential to wreak
havoc with a corporation and challenged Mr. Kipps to provide examples of instances when
the Justice Department had abused the process.Id.
84. The potential for arbitrary results stemming from prosecutorial discretion is miti
gated by the equalizing effects of the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines. See infra Section IIl. B.
85. See Square D Co. v. Niagra Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U. S. 409, 420 (1986) ("Peti
tioners have pointed to no specific statutory provision or legislative history indicating a spe
cific congressional intention to overturn the . . . construction; harmony with the general leg
islative purpose is inadequate for that formidable task. " (citation omitted)).
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to fraud committed in connection with a contract, or subcontract or
any part of a contract or subcontract . . . worth at least $1 Million." 8 6
Further, Representative McCollum indicated in the House debate that
some limits exist within the Act: "We are talking now about procure
ment contracts of $1 Million or more, very visible contracts, not the
really tiny contracts with the Government." 8 7 Unlike the hearing de
bate, these examples address neither the application of the Act to a
subcontractor as opposed to a prime contractor nor the particular is
sue of low-value subcontractor liability. Given the relative lack of
specificity, these passages should be considered less persuasive.
B.

Amendments to House Bills 3500 and 3911

Amendments made to the Act to protect small companies do not
extend relief to low-value subcontractors because the amendments
address penalties rather than liabilities and do not distinguish between
prime and subcontractors. This Section examines amendments made
to the bill's language during its passage. 8 8 These amendments demon
strate that rather than limit application to subcontractors, Congress
made last-minute modifications that resulted in greater application to
subcontractors than what previously existed.
The earliest amendments to the bill demonstrate the House's de
sire to expand, rather than limit, the effects of the Act and to tie li
ability to the contract value. These amendments lowered the standard
of proof and increased the maximum possible fine. Specifically, House
Bill 3911, introduced in February 1988, removed the need to prove
specific intent, 8 9 and also allowed the alternate fine to be "based upon

86. S. REP. No. 100-503, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U. S.C. C.A.N. 5969, 5970; see also
United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 551-52 (2d Cir. 1993). Similarly, House Bill 3500, the
original bill, was introduced in 1987 to apply "in situations involving $1,000,000 or more. "
133 CONG. REC. 27988 (1987).
87. 134 CONG. REC. 10328 (1988). He continued by stating that conditions were placed
in the bill "to protect the small businessman to make sure what we were dealing [with] . .. is
truly major fraud . . . . The objective here is not to bankrupt small companies . .. ." 134
CONG. REC. 10328 (1988).
88. For detailed information about these amendments, see H. R. 3911, lOOth Cong.
(1988). The House Bill 3911 documentation tracks a number of edits and subsequent re
reportings. Where available, references have been made to House Report 610, which ex
plains the amendments simply.
Representative William Hughes first introduced legislation that became the Act as
House Bill 3500 on October 15, 1987. H.R. REP. No. 100-610, at 2 (1988). On February 3,
1988, the House Subcommittee on Crime amended House Bill 3500, and the modified ver
sion was reported to the full committee as a clean bill (House Bill 3911) on February 4, 1988.
See H. R. REP. No. 100-610, at 5.
89. This was accomplished by replacing the previous language, taken from the Mail
Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), with language from the Bank Fraud Act, 18 U. S. C. §
1344 (1994), as had been requested by the Defense and Justice Departments. See H. R. REP.
No. 100-610, at 5; see also House Hearings, supra note 1, at 39, 77.
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double the 'value of the contract' rather than the 'object of the
fraud.' "90
While other amendments made in April 1988 did provide relief to
both contractors and subcontractors, they affected only the extent of
damages, not subcontractor liability.91 The first significant amendment
changed the maximum alternate fine under the bill from double the
value of the contract to $10,000,000.92 The second "relief" amendment
limited the situations under which the "whistleblower" reward could
be granted.93 These provisions, especially the cap and limitations on
the fine, do give relief to small businesses and are consistent with the
recommendations of business interests.94 These amendments, however,
do not distinguish between contractors and subcontractors. Nor did
Representative McCollum's comment that the Act's objective was not
to bankrupt small businesses95 suggest that he was more concerned
about subcontractors than prime contractors.96 More importantly, the
provisions address penalties but not liability.
Further amendments made by the Senate specifically recognized
that the Act applied to subcontractors but did not distinguish between
the liabilities of prime contractors and subcontractors.97 First, the Sen90. H.R. REP. NO. 100-610, at 5.
91. See id. at 6. These modifications were based on additional testimony and comments,
including that of House Bill 39ll's opponents at the March 1988 hearing.See supra note 73
and accompanying text. Other amendments made at this time further strengthened the bill.
In particular, one increased the maximum incarceration allowed under the bill from seven
years to ten years and provided for a mandatory minimum sentence of two years if the of
fense involved a foreseeable and substantial risk of personal injury.See H.R. REP. No. 100610, at 6. This provision was added in response to examples of product substitution fraud
where, for example, inferior parachute cord was supplied by a contractor. See 134 CONG.
REC. 10327 (1988). The potential for direct bodily harm distinguishes many examples of de
fense contractor fraud from the typical white-collar crime scenario.
92. See H.R.REP. No. 100-610, at 6. This amendment did address what the bill's oppo
nents thought of as an unfair magnitude of penalty in their worst-case examples. See supra
note 77 and accompanying text. The amendment further limited the alternate fine provision
as applicable only when the amount of the fraud exceeded $250,000 or when the fraud in
volved a substantial risk of personal injury. See H.R. 3911, lOOth Cong. (1988).
93. See H.R. REP. No. 100-610, at 6. The amendment excluded individuals who partici
pated in the fraud and those who could have, but failed to prevent the fraud by informing
the employer. The "whistleblower" protection provision was added with the introduction of
House Bill 3911 and was modeled on similar provisions of the False Claims Act. See id. at 5.
94. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 292-93.Moreover, the two limitations on when
the fine may be implemented appear to be the basis for Representative Mc Collum's state
ment that conditions were placed in the bill to "protect the small businessman." See 134
CONG. REC. 10328 (1988).
95. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
96. In fact, Representative Mc Collum is discussing "really tiny contracts with the Gov
ernment." 134 CONG. REC. 10328 (emphasis added). In other words, he is discussing prime
contracts, not subcontracts.
97. See generally H.R. 3911, lOOth Cong. (1988). The bill was referred to the Senate af
ter passing the full House by a vote of 419 to 0. See S. REP. No. 100-503, at 2 (1988), re
printed in 1988 U. S.C.C.A.N. 5969, 5970.
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ate Judiciary Committee modified the dollar threshold language from
"if the value of the contract for such property or services is $1,000,000
or more"9 8 to "if the value of the contract, subcontract, or any con
stituent part thereof, for such property or services is $1,000,000 or
more."99 Later, the full Senate further clarified application to subcon
tractors by adding an explicit reference: the language "in any procurement . . . for the Government" was amended to read "in any procurement . . . as a prime contractor with the United States or as a
subcontractor or supplier on a contract in which there is a prime con
tract with the United States."100 While other changes made by the Sen
ate dull the teeth of the bill, the changes did not address the primary
liability issue and gave no additional protection to low-value subcon
tractors.1 01
C.

Ambiguity in the Senate Report

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the disagreement between the
Second and Fourth Circuits is the opposite interpretations of the same
sentence of the Senate Report for the Act.102 The sentence is con
tained in a passage attempting to clarify the meaning of the phrase
"value of the contract." The Senate Report states:
Section 1031(a) applies to procurement fraud "if the value of the con
tract, subcontract, or any constituent part thereof ... is $1,000,000 or
more." The phrase "value of the contract" refers to the value of the con
tract award, or the amount the government has agreed to pay to the pro
vider of services whether or not this sum represents a profit to the con
tracting company. Furthermore, a subcontractor awarded a subcontract
valued at $1,000,000 or more is covered by this section, regardless of the

98. See H.R. 3911, lOOth Cong. The text under debate in the House hearings, therefore,
did not even mention subcontractors. Nevertheless, both supporters and opponents of the
bill assumed that the bill covered subcontractors.
99. Id. What this phrase means and its explanation in Senate Report 503 are items of
fundamental disagreement between the Second and Fourth Circuits. See infra Section 11.C.
100. See 134 CONG. REC. 31569 (1988). The Second Circuit's reading of the statute that
the "contractor ... subcontractor" phrase should "track" the "contract . . . subcontract"
phrase, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text, is further weakened because the two
phrases were added at two different times by two different groups.
101. For example, one change reduced the maximum fine under the bill from
$10,000,000 to $5,000,000. See H. R. 3911, lOOth Cong. Similarly, another change required
that the amount of any fine be proportional to the offense, and a third established a maxi
mum fine of $10,000,000 for multiple-count prosecutions. See id. These changes affected the
penalty magnitude, but not the reach, of the bill. The Senate limited the scope only by fur
ther extending Representative Mc Collum's limitations to the alternate fine. Specifically, the
amount-of-the-fraud threshold was increased from $250,000 to $500,000, and the endanger
ment threshold was changed from a "foreseeable and substantial risk" to a "conscious or
reckless risk" standard. See id.
102. See United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 370 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1993).
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amount of the contract award to the contractor or other subcontrac
tors.103

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the "Senate report explanation
supports the interpretation that the statute applies to the entire pro
curement effort where any contractual component has a value of $1
million or more."104 On the other hand, the Second Circuit read the
same language and concluded that "the committee instructs that, in
the case of a subcontractor, the value of the subcontract is controlling
and not the value of the prime contract or other subcontract. . . ."105
The Second Circuit interpretation, however, is unsupported by the
legislative history as a whole and, accordingly, should not be fol
lowed.106 Even before the Senate added specific subcontractor lan
guage to the bill, both proponents and opponents assumed low-value
subcontractors would be covered.107 The legislative history is also re
plete with examples where small subcontractors are the fraudulent ac
tors.10 8 Congress specifically focused on small subcontractor cases such
as Spring Works: "While these criminal schemes are often life threat
ening and can have a disastrous effect on the ability of our troops to
complete their mission, we have not received a significant sentence on
most of these cases."1 09
The Senate Report's language that a $1,000,000 subcontract trig
gers application of the Act regardless of the value of a particular
prime contract is meant to clarify the Act's application to subcontrac
tors that might be exempted if only the value of the prime contract
was considered.U 0 The record does not suggest that the report even
considered the question of which agreement is "controlling" to be
relevant. The report says merely that the subcontract value is adequate
for application, but the Second Circuit's inference of necessity is not
103. S. REP. No. 100-503, at 12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U. S. C. C.A.N. 5969, 5975-76.
104. Brooks, 111 F.3d at 370.
105. Nadi, 996 F.2d at 551. The Second Circuit continues: "The committee . . . appar

ently had in mind situations where an individual subcontract is of greater value than the
prime contract. We may infer from this that, where the subcontract is of lesser value than the
contract, the value of the subcontract is also controlling." Id. at 551.
106. See Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1995) ("In light of the overrid
ing legislative intent . . . we cannot employ two sentences in a legislative report to trump
statutory language and a clearly stated legislative purpose.").
107. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
108. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 167 (listing cases). The Spring Works case
provides a compelling example. In that case, the subcontract value was reported to be only
$160, see Brooks, 1 1 1 F.3d at 369, yet the cost to the government exceeded $1,500,000 and
failure of the substandard parts could have caused a loss of life. See United States v. Spring
Works, Inc., No. C R 86-1112- WM B ( C.D. Cal. April 6, 1987) (sentencing memorandum),
reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 1, at 175.
109. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 43.
1 10. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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supported by the report. Moreover, reading the Senate's comment to
narrow application of the Act is grossly inconsistent with the overall
intent of Congress to develop an expansive, stand-alone statute to ad
dress cases of contract fraud committed against the United States.111
Correctly, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation that the statute ap
plies when the value of any contractual component exceeds
$1,000,00011 2 is consistent with the Act's entire legislative history.113
The Fourth Circuit did not rely on an inference, but simply took the
report at face value. Accordingly, this interpretation should be fol
lowed by other courts in the future.
III. P OLICY IMPLICATIONS: W HY Do IT THE HARD W AY?

This Part argues that prosecution of low-value subcontractors un
der the Act is desirable because it facilitates fair and efficient prosecu
tions that send a clear symbolic message. Section III.A demonstrates
that use of a statute that has been narrowly tailored toward fraud by
government contractors is preferable because its use is more straight
forward and efficient than are other potential means of prosecution,
even if some redundancy exists. Moreover, as argued in Section III.B,
equalization of penalties caused by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
negates arguments that the Act should not apply to subcontractors be
cause of severe and disproportionate punishments.
A.

Superiority of a Stand-Alone Statute

Use of the Act in this context is desirable because of benefits in
herent in a narrowly tailored statute. Specifically, application of the
Act enables straightforward and efficient prosecutions and allows
utilization of a statute that has been tailored toward fraud in a con
tract setting.114
Congress recognized these benefits during the legislative develop
ment of the Act. During Senate hearings, the Justice Department
identified the creation of a general fraud crime as, in itself, reason to
support the Act.115 The Department pointed to the benefits of a similar
1 11. See S. REP. NO. 100-503, at 11-12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U. S. C. C.A.N. 5969,
5975-76. Had narrowing liability been the goal, the Senate might have said "a subcontrac

tor . . . is covered . . . only . . . . " Instead, the report uses the expansive language "a subcon
tractor . . . is covered . . . regardless . . . .
"

112. See Brooks, 111 F 3 d at 370.
.

1 13. See Sections II.A and 11.B.
114. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 280-81 (1982) (discussing efficiency concerns in the

interpretation of criminal statutes).
115. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 60 ("There are really five significant provi
sions in this piece of legislation . . . . The first is the creation of the general fraud crime in the
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stand-alone statute, the Bank Fraud Act, passed in 1984.116 The
Department asserted that the Bank Fraud Act had "facilitated and
simplified the prosecution of hundreds of cases throughout the coun
try."117 Based on this observation, the Department recommended that
Congress consider enacting the general fraud provision of the Act as a
stand-alone felony and that the $1,000,000 contract threshold apply as
a trigger not for prosecution but for enhanced penalties.11 8
Members of Congress also recognized these benefits. Indeed, crea
tion of a free-standing statute was identified as one of the main pur
poses of the Act.1 1 9 Representative Hughes noted, "At the present
time . . . [w]e have to shop around. Can we put it within mail fraud?
Can we put in within wire fraud? . . . We have no free-standing fraud
statute as such."120 Similar motivation and desire for a stand-alone
statute were evidenced when Congress passed the earlier Bank Fraud
Act.121
The primacy of laws targeting specific, as opposed to general, kinds
of criminal activity is also reflected in courts' interpretations of con
flicting statutes. The Supreme Court has concluded that a specific
policy embodied in a later statute should control over an older, more
general statute.122 Similarly, a canon of statutory construction dictates
that, wherever a conflict exists, the more specific law should prevail
over the more general.1 23 While these holdings deal with cases of con
flict, the logic reflects the conclusion that the law that more precisely
addresses the issue better reflects legislative policy than does a law
that is merely peripheral.

procurement process. This idea is very similar to what we had in the bank fraud area several
years ago when we came here asking for help ... . ) (statement of Deputy Assistant Attor
ney General Victoria Toensing). This basis for support was not as prominent during the ear
lier House hearings, perhaps because the effects of the Sentencing Guidelines were less un
derstood at that time.
"

116. See id.
117. Id. at 65.
118. See id. at 70.
119. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 311 (statement of Rep. Hughes) ("One of the
criticisms leveled by the panel of H. R. 3911 is that it will not increase the number of fraud
cases. It is not the purpose, really, of this bill to do that. The purpose is to deter. And in the
second place, to provide a freestanding statute that will cover acts of fraud against the
United States Government . . . . ).
"

120. See id. at 300.
121. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 377-78 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U. S. C. C.A.N. 3182,
3517-19 ("This approach of prosecuting bank fraud under statutes not specifically designed
to reach this criminal conduct is necessarily problematic. ").
122. See United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U. S. 517, 530 (1998).
123. See, e.g., Security Pac. Nat'! Bank v. Resolution Trust Corp., 63 F.3d 900, 904 (9th
Cir.1995) ("Generally a more specific provision of an enactment prevails [over], in the sense
of making an exception to, a more general provision. ").
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Moreover, Congress passed the Act also to send a symbolic mes
sage of no tolerance for fraud against the government, even if the Act
was redundant with pre-existing statutes. One argument that could be
made against applying the Act to low-value subcontractors is that
other statutes could also be used to punish wrongdoers. This argument
applies indiscriminately to both prime contractors and subcontractors,
and the mere existence of alternative statutes that could serve as the
basis of prosecution does not mean that the Act should not apply.
The scope of the Act concededly does overlap with other criminal
statutes. Prior to passage of the Act, contract fraud against the United
States was typically prosecuted under a variety of more general stat
utes.124 These include the False Claims Act,125 the False Statements
Act,126 and statutes against conspiracy to defraud.12 7 Similarly, the Mail
Fraud128 and Wire Fraud129 statutes were sometimes used to reach
cases where the mail or telephone was used to execute the fraud.13° Fi
nally, state fraud statutes could also be used as a means of prosecu
tion.131
One might incorrectly conclude, then, that use of the Act in cases
of low-value subcontractors is not appropriate or necessary to prose
cute the wrongdoers.132 Opponents of the Act argued that it should not
124. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 77.
125. 18 u.s.c.§§ 286-287 (1994).
126. 18 u.s.c.§ 1001 (1994).
127. 18 u.s.c.§ 371 (1994).
128. 18 u.s.c.§§ 1341-1342 (1994).
129. 18 u.s.c.§ 1343 (1994).
130. Noncriminal means are also available to address fraud. In 1986, Congress passed
the False Claims Ame.ndment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified at 31
U. S.C.§ 3701 (1994)), and the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99509, 100 Stat. 1874 (codified at 31 U. S.C.§ 3801 (1994)), to strengthen civil deterrents. These
provisions raised civil and criminal penalties for violations involving fraud and false claims,
provided protection for "whistleblowers," and strengthened provisions relating to qui tam
suits involving government fraud. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 10; House Hearings,
supra note 1, at 9, 10, 192. Moreover, independent of judicial sanctions, government contrac
tors can be debarred from future contracts. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 126-30.
131. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32 ( Vernon 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
750.280 (1991) (specifying penalties for any person convicted of "any gross fraud or cheat at
common law"). While opponents of the Act did look to the availability of alternative federal
statutes, the presence of state criminal statutes was not invoked during committee testimony.
As a general matter, a federal issue would seem to be involved when the federal government
is the target of the crime and the appropriateness of federal legislation was not debated.
132. The court in United States v. Brooks did believe that the Act was necessary to effectively reach such parties:
We believe that our reading of the statute is no more anomalous than one which allows small
subcontractors to escape prosecution under the provision . . . simply by ensuring that their
own subcontract stays below the . .. jurisdictional amount. The Nadi court's interpretation
could significantly undermine the purpose of the statute because pervasive fraud on a multi
million dollar defense project would be unreachable under the statute . .. if it were perpe
trated in multiple separate subcontracts . . ..
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be passed because it offered nothing new: "Where is the evidence that
[other] legislation has not done the job? In light of all this recent leg
islation, we believe further activity in this area to be unnecessary, re
dundant and - in fact - counterproductive."133 Even while strongly
supporting passage of the Act in 1988, the Justice Department admit
ted that "[g]enerally, we have not encountered situations where con
duct relating to fraud against the United States does not fall within the
prohibitions of one or more of the [other] statutes."134
Possible redundancy or lack of necessity, however, does not invali
date application if the language and history indicate that the Act does
apply.135 While arguing the benefits of a stand-alone statute, the
Justice Department cited the Bank Fraud Act,13 6 which was passed by
Congress in 1984 even though "[t]he great majority of cases of bank
fraud we encountered were cognizable under [the] old statutes . . . ."137
Even if the statute is largely - or solely - a symbolic means of fo
cusing attention on a particular type of crime, its symbolic function
does not undermine its force as law.13 8
Moreover, although other means of prosecution are available, this
redundancy applies to both low-value and high-value contractors. In
other words, the Act undeniably applies to large prime contractors de
spite the existence of these same alternative means of prosecution. Al
though large prime contractors may be comparatively harder to punish
and deter than smaller subcontractors,139 that distinction alone cannot
remove subcontractors from the scope of liability.

111 F.3d 365, 369 (4th Cir. 1997).
133. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 284-85; see also id. at 384-85.
134. Id. at 34.
135. See Connecticut Nat'!. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992) (" Redundancies
across statutes are not unusual events in drafting ....").
136. 18 u.s.c. § 1344 (1994).
137. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 65.
138. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Patholo
gies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 84-85 (1997) (discussing a category of laws they call "symbolic statutes "
that are not truly instrumental but rather express who we are as a society).
139. Large contractors do have greater political and economic power than do low-value
subcontractors. Representative Hughes stated in testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee that the ongoing procurement scandal in 1988 "suggests . . . that our current
Federal statutes are not providing a sufficient deterrent. " Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at
25. Hughes and other members of Congress reached this conclusion based on findings that
many large contractors simply had too much power to be punished adequately under the
existing law. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 100. Similarly, because the biggest contrac
tors hold such a large share of the market, deterrence through debarment may not be effec
tive. See id. at 130. Representative Hughes remarked, "I find that the small contractors are
being dealt with very harshly but the larger ones are basically being restored. General Dy
namics is a good example since they were restored within five months." Id.
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These arguments of redundancy and lack of necessity were raised
by opponents to the Act before its passage, and were simply rejected
by Congress. Regardless of the sympathy that smaller businesses tend
to attract, even those that are fraudulent actors, the rationale sup
porting a stand-alone statute is just as strong when applied to subcon
tractors as to any other fraudulent actor.
B.

Equalization of Punishment

Arguments that the Act should not be applied to low-value sub
contractors because the magnitude of the penalty will be unfair also
are not persuasive. Although Congress intended the Act to carry
heightened penalties, the subsequent enactment of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines creates punishments that are, by design, pro
portional to the magnitude of the offense.140
Although the language and history of the Act direct that it should
be applied to cases of low-value subcontractor fraud, some courts may
still consider prosecution to be unfair.141 Similarly, some courts may be
hesitant to allow prosecution under the Act if the penalty is perceived
to lack proportion to the offense.142 This perspective stems from the
observation that a mode of punishment necessary to deter large cor
porations and contractors may not be necessary, and thus is not ap
propriate, with respect to small businesses. Congress passed the Act as
a means to reach wrongdoers who may not have been adequately de
terred by the pre-existing penalties,143 and thus one might think that
heightened penalties may not be justified as applied to smaller entities.
As discussed above, contract fraud potentially may also be prose
cuted under a variety of other statutes.144 Statutory instruction on im
prisonment and fines is limited under the various alternative stat-

140. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were authorized in the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994). Congressional debate on the Act in 1987 and 1988 occurred
less than one year after the Sentencing Commission's initial guidelines took effect. See
THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 1-2 (2000) .
141. See United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1993) (limiting application so
as to avoid "the potential anomaly of small subcontractors . . . being prosecuted under the
Act ").
142. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). This case was cited by the U. S. Chamber
of Commerce in hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Senate Hearings, supra
note 1, at 161. But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 965 (1991) (holding that Eighth
Amendment does not require the magnitude of the punishment to be proportional to the
offense).
143. See generally George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL.
ECON. 526 (1970) (discussing efficiency and the adequacy of deterrence under criminal statute enforcement regimes).
144. See supra note 55.

·
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utes.145 In general, like the Act, these statutes provide upper limits on
the penalties to be levied.146
Although the statutory language of the False Claims Act, False
Statements Act, Mail Fraud Act, Wire Fraud Act and the Major Fraud
Act differ in some respects, all of the acts require that penalties be de
termined in accordance with section 2Fl.1 of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines related to fraud and deceit.147 While the conspiracy statute
does not explicitly reference section 2Fl.l, section 2Xl.1 links cases of
conspiracy to the underlying substantive violation of fraud.14 8 Unlike
the threshold provision of the Act that ties application to the value of
the contract,149 punishment - both fines and imprisonment - under
the Guidelines depends primarily on the amount of "loss."150 In other
words, the punishment is intended to be proportional to the harm
caused by the offense.151
Defining loss under the Guidelines is itself a disputed issue.152 The
application notes (which are guidance materials prepared by the
Sentencing Commission that accompany section 2Fl.1), however, con
tain specific instructions with respect to contract fraud and indicate
that loss includes consequential damages:
[L]oss in a procurement fraud or product substitution case includes not
only direct damages , but also consequential damages that were reasona
bly foreseeable. For example, in a case involving a defense product sub
stitution offense, the loss includes the government 's reasonably foresee 
able costs of ma king substitute transactions .... Similarly ... loss
includes the reasonably foreseeable administrative cost to the govern 145. For example, the False Claims Act, l S U. S. C. § 287 (1994), and the False State
ments Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1001 (1994), provide only that punishment include fines under "this
title " and imprisonment of not more than five years.
146. The Act provides that, in general, fines should not exceed $1,000,000 and that im
prisonment should not exceed ten years. 18 U. S. C. § 1031(a) (1994).
147. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app.A (2000) (providing an index of
applicable Guidelines Manual sections by statute).
148. See United States v. Tatum, 138 F.3d 1344, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that
procurement fraud guidelines under Section 2Fl.1 should be applied in cases of conspiracy
to defraud the government).
149. See 18 U.S.C. 103l(a).
150. U S SG § 2Fl.l (b)(l).
151. This aspect of proportionality was one of the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1994, which sought to minimize differences in punishment for the same underlying con
duct. See HUTCHISON, supra note 140, at 2.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 199 F.3d 1328 (4th Cir. 1999) (remanding a
conviction under the Act and other statutes for recalculation of the amount of loss and re
sentencing); United States v. Sublett, 124 F.3d 693, 695 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
amount of loss should be decreased to account for legitimate services actually provided, even
if the services were fraudulently provided); Tris Felix & Jason P. Hoffman, Note, The Fed
eral Judiciary in Discord: What is the Meaning of "Loss" Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Governing Fraud Offenses?, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 179 (1995). This dispute will af

fect sentencing regardless of whether the Act or an alternative statute is used.
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ment and other participant s of repeating or correcting the procurement
action affected . . . 153
.

This provision ensures that the full extent of the harm, rather than an
amount such as the contract value or profit, be considered when de
termining an appropriate punishment.
Moreover, following provisions introduced as part of the Act, the
Guidelines provide that in cases involving "conscious or reckless risk
of serious bodily injury" the offense level be increased by two levels to
a minimum level of twelve.154 This provision creates a minimum sen
tence of one year and increases sentences by approximately six
months.155 This additional penalty addresses what Congress believed
to be especially egregious cases where substitution of defective prod
ucts could endanger the lives of military personnel. Although this por
tion of the Sentencing Guidelines was added in conjunction with the
Act, courts have held that it applies even when the Act is not the basis
of the prosecution.156
These effects of the Sentencing Guidelines were anticipated at the
time of passage of the Act. The Department of Justice noted before
the House Judiciary Committee:
[A ]n initia l reading of the guide line s would sugge st that a fir st of fender,
the typica l defendant in procurement ca se s, who organized a group ...
which conducted a ... fraud costing the Government more than $5 mi l
lion, would receive a guideline sentence of 46 to 57 month s. This guide
line sentence, ari sing out of a very serious fraud, would be within the
[five -year ] statutory maximum permitted by existing law
157
.

.

.

.

The Department nonetheless supported the seven-year maximum be
cause it believed that the Sentencing Commission might amend the
Guidelines or that a judge might use the Act as a basis for departing
upward from the prescribed sentence.1 5 8 In the subsequent ten years,
the Sentencing Commission responded only by providing clarification
of the calculation of the loss.159 Under the 1998 Guidelines, a sentence
of seven years for a first-time offender would be possible only if the

153. U S SG § 2Fl.1, cmt. n. 8(c).
154. Id. § 2Fl.1(7).
155. See id. § 5A.
156. See, e.g., United States v. McCord, Inc., 143 F.3d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding
that enhancement for "conscious or reckless risk " can apply in prosecutions under the False
Statements Act); United States v. Hall, 71 F.3d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the
enhancement can apply in cases where the fraud itself creates the risk but declining to apply
the enhancement when the risk was created during flight from the police).
157. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 31.
158. See id. at 52-53.
159. See U S SG § 2Fl.1, cmt. n. 7.
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loss exceeded $40,000,000 and the fraud involved a conscious or reck
less risk of serious bodily harm.160
The effects of the Guidelines on fines similarly prevent punish
ments under the Act that might be considered unfair. Section 2F1.1 of
the Sentencing Guidelines Manual does not contain special rules re
garding fines, and thus fines are determined following the general
Guidelines rule.161 With respect to organizational defendants, base
fines may exceed $20,000,000, and these base fines may be further
multiplied under the Guidelines.162 Given the Act's limit of
$10,000,000, fines of organizational defendants under the Act may ac
tually be limited compared to alternative statutes that simply provide
for fines "under this title."
The situation is somewhat different for fines for individual defen
dants. While maximum fines for individuals are normally $250,000,163
that maximum does not apply if, as in this case, the statute authorizes
a greater maximum fine.164 Notwithstanding the standard limit, how
ever, another section of the criminal code provides for an alternative
maximum fine of twice the gain or loss associated with a fraud,165 and
this alternative maximum is available in prosecutions using alterna
tives to the Act. A fine exceeding the normal maximum of $250,000
would be available under the Act and would be appropriate given the
listed factors166 only in circumstances in which a large loss was suf
fered. These same circumstances would also allow fines that exceed
$250,000 based on the section of the code allowing for fines based on
the amount of loss or gain, even without the statutory maximum pro
vided by the Act. The Act's heightened maximum fine provisions,
therefore, have little effect when compared with the alternative law.
In sum, the punishment a wrongdoer receives will be equivalent
whether prosecuted under the Act or an alternative statute. Therefore,
objections to prosecution based on a concern over disproportionate
punishment are not persuasive.

160. See id. §§ 2Fl.1 , 5A. Sentences for repeat offenders can more easily reach the
seven-year maximum sentence.
161. See id. §§ 5El.2(b) 8 C2.4(b).
,

162. See id. § 8C2.4(d).
163. See id. § 5El.2(c)(2).
164. See id. § 5El.2(c)(4).
165. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571(b)(2), 3571(d) (1994). This alternative maximum is also re
ferred to in the Act.See 18 U. S. C. § 1031(d) (1994).
166. See 18 U. S. C. § 1031(e). These factors mirror those used by the Sentencing Guide
lines to establish the severity of punishment. See U S SG § 5El.2.
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CONCLU SION

The Major Fraud Act is the appropriate statute under which to
prosecute both contractors and subcontractors that have committed
fraud against the United States. Language within the Act limiting li
ability to cases where "the value of the contract, subcontract, or any
constituent part . . . is $1,000,000 or more"167 should not be interpreted
to exclude from prosecution subcontractors on prime contracts with
the government that exceed $1,000,000, even if the value of the spe
cific subcontract is less than $1,000,000. Rather, the statute and its
legislative history support prosecution of low-value subcontractors, as
does the broader policy desire to utilize criminal statutes that are spe
cifically tailored to the underlying offense.
Although less of a political issue than in the late 1980s, 168 fraud
against the government continues to be a significant fiscal issue. The
Department of Defense alone, for example, has a total annual budget
approaching $300 billion and spends approximately $200 billion of that
on defense contracts.16 9 Recent defense spending increases are the
largest since the mid-1980s, when the fraud scandals that led to the
Act occurred,170 and the George W. Bush administration has identified
further increases as a priority.171 Despite the reforms of the past dozen
years, the General Accounting Office considers defense contracting to
be at high risk for fraud and other abuses,172 and fraud continues to
167. 18 u.s.c. § 1031 (1994).
168. A 2000 Gallup survey indicated that sixteen percent of people identified "educa
tion, " the most frequent response, as the country's "most important problem, " with all eco
nomic issues accounting for Jess than thirty percent of responses. Government waste was not
specifically identified among the responses. See Frank Newport, Economy, Education,
Health, Crime and Morality Most on American's Minds, GALLUP ORGANIZATION, June 22,
2000 available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr000622b.asp>. For "most important
problem " survey results, see <http://www.gallup.com/po!Uindicators/lndmip.asp>. In com
parison, during testimony on the Act, witness Dina Rasor, of the non-profit group Project on
Military Procurement, referred to a September 1988 U.S. News and World Report poll in
which eighty-six percent of respondents answered that the next president should devote
more resources to fighting waste and fraud and abuse within the government. See House
Hearings, supra note 1 , at 100.
169. See Greg Schneider, Pentagon Seeks to Aid Defense Contractors, WASH. POST, Feb.
8, 2000, at El; Dividing Defense Dollars, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1998, at A23.
170. See Eric Pianin & Dan Morgan, Congress Tapping Surplus for Tax Cuts, Domestic
Programs, WASH. POST, July 21, 2000, at A4; Eric Pianin, Legislative Outlook is Mostly Dim,
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1999, at A4. These recent increases have been criticized by some on the
grounds that the dollars could be found by trimming "pork " from the acquisition programs.
See Editorial, More Realistic Defense Budgeting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1999, at A16.

171. See Thomas E. Ricks & Hanna Rosin, Bush Pledges Safety of Social Security,
WASH. POST, June 7, 2000, at A6; Roberto Suro, Joint Chiefs Aim Big Budget Request at
Next President, WASH. POST, June 5, 2000, at Al.
172. See Stephen Barr, Identifying Risky Programs: GAO Lists 5 More as Vulnerable to
Fraud, Waste, Abuse, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1997, at A23; see generally U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGH-RISK SERIES: DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT (1997).
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make the news.173 Whether a particular bad actor happens to be the
prime or subcontractor should not limit the ability of the United States
to prosecute under the Act.

173. See Lorraine Adams, Contractors in the Dock: 21 Charged After Undercover Probe
ofNavy Fraud, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1999, at A33.

